We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and …ghting capacities of di¤erent groups matter for ethnic con ‡ict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential con ‡icts (and hence multiple threat points) is identi…ed. The theory predicts con ‡ict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist con ‡ict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.
Introduction
The empirical literature on con ‡ict has found that the existence of natural resources and of ethnic divisions make a country more prone to war (see e.g., Collier and Hoe-er, 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) . Our goal in this paper is to provide a uni…ed theoretical framework for the study of multiple types of con ‡ict that takes into account natural resources, geography, and ethnicity.
In every society, groups typically di¤er in political power, size, location, wealths, and shares of the surplus from the extraction of natural resources in di¤erent regions. For all the combinations of parameters capturing the above heterogeneities, we will characterize the equilibrium strategies and outcomes. In particular, we focus on what set of initial conditions may induce peace, secessionist con ‡ict, uncontested secession or centrist con ‡ict (i.e., con ‡ict with the aim of conquering the whole state).
We will …rst analyze the model when the government can select an optimal level of rent sharing, which corresponds to a situation in which frictionless bargaining is possible. We will show that even in this frictionless environment the mere presence of two types of con ‡ict incentives (secessionist and centrist) for di¤erent combinations of resource and strength distributions may make it impossible to reach a surplus sharing agreement that induces peace. In particular, our theory predicts that costly con ‡ict is harder to avoid when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven (i.e., when the homelands of a minority group are particularly resource rich) and when it is much easier for a minority group to win a secessionist rather than a centrist con ‡ict. Intuitively, in such a situation secession attempts are a salient option for the minority group, which leads to two salient threat points that cannot be jointly addressed by bargaining.
After deriving the empirically testable implications of the new source of bargaining failure that we uncover, we will turn to examine the implications of the model for the (realistic) cases in which surplus sharing cannot be easily adjusted, corresponding to situations in which bargaining on surplus shares is not frictionless. 1 Clearly, when the rent share of the minority group is di¢ cult to (credibly) change in the short run, this further reinforces the potential for con ‡icts. Our framework allows us to make detailed predictions on how parameter values map into various forms of outcomes.
Our model has also some simple but at the same time important implications for the discussion on the role of power sharing agreements: A failure of "minimal strength proportionality" is most likely to cause a centrist all-out con ‡ict, i.e., a war that will involve all the regions of the State, whereas a secessionist con ‡ict has always a failure of "resource proportionality" among its causes.
Besides the novel type of bargaining failure result and the conceptual contribution about power sharing, the contribution of the paper is in the detailed implications it allows us to draw and test on the role of the geographic distribution of natural resources for the di¤erent types of con ‡ict.
The previous theoretical literature did not contain, in fact, such a characterization. 2 Our model is the …rst one to focus on resource location and the initial distribution of natural resource rents and wealth across di¤erent ethnic groups, and to study the ensuing incentives of di¤erent groups to determine con ‡ict, distinguishing between cases in which the incentives lead to secessionist con ‡ict and cases in which the civil war does not have secession at stake.
Several historical examples suggest that natural resource location matters indeed in reality.
When the presence of a local ethnic group coincides with large natural resource abundance concentrated in its region, this local ethnic group could be …nancially better o¤ if it were independent and may under some conditions have incentives to start secessionist rebellion. This corresponds for example to the separatist movement in the now independent Timor-Leste, and the recent turmoil in the oil-abundant regions of Nigeria. Also the rebellion of the Aceh Freedom Movement in Indonesia starting in 1976 and the armed …ght of the Sudan People's Liberation Army beginning in 1983 can to a large extent be explained by the abundance of natural resources in these separatist regions. 3 Other countries where secessionist movements have been linked to large local natural resources include Angola, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Morocco and Papua New Guinea (see Ross, 2004 , for a discussion).
In all the cases above, an uneven natural resource distribution was ampli…ed by ethnic divisions.
In contrast, if natural resources are absent or if natural resources (and political power) are evenly dispersed in a country, there are typically few incentives for con ‡ict, even when there are ethnic 2 Ray (2010, 2010b) are mostly focused on the role of inequality and fractionalization, which we also consider as an important set of fundamental reasons for con ‡ict, but they do not take the role played by natural resources into account. Caselli and Coleman (2006) focus on the decision of the dominant ethnic group to exploit or not the other groups in terms of the proceeds from extraction of natural resources, but do not take into account how the geographic distribution and the economic features of natural resources a¤ect the risk of ethnic con ‡ict of di¤erent kinds. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001) build a dynamic version of a Hirshleifer-style model of con ‡ict over a single contested renewable resource. Also Grossman and Mendoza (2003) use a dynamic framework to predict that present resource scarcity and future resource abundance cause appropriative competition. Hodler (2006) …nds that natural resources lead to lower growth in fractionalized countries through the channel of more …ghting. Caselli (2006) studies elite behavior in resource abundant countries to discuss potential politico-economic channels for the resource curse. Similarly, Fearon (2005) argues that natural resources can foster con ‡ict by weakening state capacity. Besley and Persson (2009) emphasize that weak institutions, low income and large natural resources lead to a greater risk of civil war. Van der Ploeg and Rohner (2010) study the two-way interaction between natural resource extraction and con ‡ict, allowing for depletion speed and method to be endogenous.
3 For a discussion of these cases see Ross (2004b) .
divisions. 4 Similarly, when there are large amounts of natural resources available, but the society is ethnically homogeneous, con ‡ict incentives are weak. 5 We immediately turn now to present our basic model and bargaining failure result in section 2, followed by the equilibrium characterization in section 3 of the di¤erent types of con ‡ict when other forms of bargaining frictions make it di¢ cult to alter surplus sharing. The empirical implications of this new framework are very rich, and hence we kindly ask the reader to wait for these until sections 4 and 5: In section 4 we spell out all the implications and relate them to the existing empirical evidence; in section 5 we perform our own estimations of some of the predictions using novel panel data on the ethnic group level. Section 6 concludes. Appendices A to C contain some supplemental material and Appendix D the description of our data.
Frictionless Model

Setup
Consider a country populated by two ethnic groups, i and j. 6 The country is divided in two clearly de…ned regions, 1; 2. We allow for di¤erent values of extractable natural resources in the regions 1 and 2, labeled r 1 and r 2 , respectively. 7 For simplicity, natural resource extraction and export of such resources is the only activity in the country, and this sole activity is conducted by a unique State …rm. The group in power can control the sharing of the ensuing surplus.
There are n 1 i and n 2 i members of group i in regions 1 and 2 respectively, and n 1 j ; n 2 j of group j. Assume that the two groups are to some degree concentrated in the two regions, as is very often the case. In particular, assume n 1 i =n 2 i > n 1 j =n 2 j . We assume that group j controls the government at the beginning of the game, which may mean that group j is a majority group (n j = n 1 j + n 2 j > n i = n 1 i + n 2 i ) in a democracy, or simply that j had won some con ‡ict for power in a prior period.
In this section we assume that group j in power can choose the shares ; (1 ) of the surplus to be attributed to groups i and j, respectively, and we assume that none of the standard bargaining frictions, like asymmetric information, agency, indivisibilities or commitment problems, are present. However, in spite of the absence of the standard frictions, we will show that the interac-4 This is for example the case of countries like Benin or Mali, which have only few natural resources, or of small oil-rich countries like Brunei or Qatar, where natural resources are evenly spread.
5 Examples for this include Chile and Mongolia. 6 We assume that ethnicity is the only cleavage, hence abstracting from class con ‡ict or other di¤erences within groups that could induce di¤erent political alignments or coalitions to form. See Ray (2009) for a treatment of multiple markers. 7 The variables r1 and r2 capture the total value of rents, corresponding to the product of the amounts extracted times their price. Hence, r1 and r2 increase when there are resource discoveries or when the world prices rise. tion of the three key variables described above, namely ethnic division, concentration of groups and distribution of natural resources in the di¤erent regions, can create nonetheless reasons for con ‡ict.
There are four potential outcomes: peace (P ), secessionist con ‡ict (S), centrist (or all-out) con ‡ict (C), and accepted secession (A). Secessionist con ‡ict refers to war started with the aim of founding an independent State in one of the two regions, while centrist con ‡ict is about gaining the control of the whole country. In this section we focus on the parameter values for which accepted secession will never occur. This streamlines the analysis without loss of generality of the important insights. In Appendix C we derive in detail for what parameter values accepted secession could occur in this framework.
The time line of the sequential version of the game is as follows:
1. group j selects ; 2. Nature selects player i as next mover with probability , while with probability (1 ) j is selected by Nature to be the only player with an opportunity to take violent actions; 8 3. if i is the selected mover, i can choose between accepting the surplus sharing arrangement (action p), start a centrist war (action c), or request secession (action s), implying separation of region 1 from region 2; if j is selected as the only potential mover, it can only choose between action p and action c; 9
4. if i accepts the surplus sharing arrangement (action p), the peaceful payo¤s are realized; if i chooses a centrist con ‡ict (c), j has no choice but to …ght back, in which case there is a standard contest success function determining the outcome; …nally, if i asked for secession (s), then group j has the choice between accepting secession (a) and …ghting against it (f ), in which case the di¤erent nature of the …ght (regional as opposed to spread out) determines a di¤erent contest success function. Similarly, if j is drawn by Nature, action p leads to peace, and action c to centrist con ‡ict.
If peace (P) prevails, total group payo¤s from natural resources are
8 In Appendix B we present a simultaneous moves version of the model. All results go through, but the exposition of section 3 would be messier with the simultaneous moves version. 9 For simplicity, we ignore the (unrealistic) possibility that a group in power proposes secession of some region. We could easily extend the framework to allow for it.
On top of these ‡ows of rents from selling oil or alike, each group may have control of a miscellaneous of other sources of wealth or income, and we will denote the per capita usable stock of such nonresource based wealth as w i ; w j . These accumulated stocks are those that determine, together with the relative population sizes, the strength of the two groups in case of con ‡ict, as we will see below.
There is an important di¤erence between wealth from natural resource rents and wealth from industrial activity and the like. Typically only a small fraction of the former type of wealth is destroyed in con ‡ict, while much of the latter type is often destroyed, because it is a vital input of the capacity of a …ghting group or State in a con ‡ict. Oil …elds and diamond mines (and especially their future productivity) "survive" …ghting, while high-tech industries and banking su¤er considerably from political instability. 10 A similar argument could be applied to distinguish between various sorts of natural resources, according to their risk of destruction in civil war.
If centrist all-out con ‡ict is initiated, we assume that the winner takes all the relevant natural resource rents in the relevant period. For simplicity the winner does not take instead the undestroyed wealth stocks. 11
Thus, the payo¤s for centrist con ‡ict (C) are as follows:
where p c is the winning probability of group i in centrist con ‡ict and d denotes the fraction of the wealth stocks destroyed in the …ghting. Con ‡ict is costly only in terms of destroyed capital. Adding human losses would not alter the main results, but would make the analysis more tedious. 12 The probability with which i wins a centrist con ‡ict can be expressed as:
where measures the extra strength of group j due to the control of the government and perhaps the army. In this contest success function (CSF) the ratio of total wealth matters. Like Jackson and Morelli (2007) and Esteban and Ray (2010) we regard wealth as capacity, and therefore assume 1 0 For these reasons, perhaps, full-blown con ‡ict could be avoided in the Basque country and the Flemish region, even though their economic strength would give them incentives to split from Spain and from Belgium respectively. 1 1 Our qualitative results go through when we include additional punishment means like wealth expropriation. The distinction between allowing the winner to take over also the stocks or not would probably matter more in a potential dynamic extension of the model. 1 2 In a complementary paper, Esteban, Morelli and Rohner (2010) deal explicitly with the strategic incentives to decimate the population of enemies. a group's probability of winning to be increasing in its total wealth. 13 The logic of secessionist con ‡ict is similar. We assume that when group i's secession attempt is unsuccessful, i is deprived of all resource rents during the present period. Again, we could allow for further punishment without a¤ecting the qualitative results. When secession is successful, region 1 splits and group i gains control over all resources in region 1. The minorities in the new countries n 1 j and n 2 i are discriminated and do not receive anything. The group leaders have a utilitarian social welfare function with equal weights for any group member independent of her location, i.e., they simply maximize the total rents. Again, con ‡ict destroys a part d of the wealth in the con ‡ict zone. Hence, the payo¤s under secessionist con ‡ict are:
where p s is the winning probability of group i in secessionist con ‡ict, which can be expressed as follows:
Note that in case of a secessionist con ‡ict the men used are only those in the con ‡ict region. 14 The last possible outcome is accepted secession (A), which occurs when group i attempts secession (action s) and group j accepts the proposal without …ghting (action a). In this case:
Clearly, group i would always prefer accepted secession to secessionist con ‡ict. In contrast, the ruling group j prefers to "…ght out" secession attempts when …ghting is not too costly, i.e., 1 3 Another interpretation of this formula and the destruction cost of war is that groups select what part of their wealth they want to invest as sunk cost in con ‡ict. If they are constraint to not be able to invest more than d percent of their wealth and if this constraint is binding for both groups, this would lead exactly to the formula above and the corresponding costs of war.
1 4 We could easily add some parameter to account for the fact that mountainous terrain, geographical remoteness, ideological recruitment etc provide a larger advantage for group i in secessionist than in centrist wars (cf. Gates, 2002; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009 ). 15 In the present section we focus on situations where this condition holds, which allows us to disregard the possibility of accepted secession. In Appendix C we show that when this condition does not hold there is an additional zone of parameter values for which bargaining fails to prevent accepted secession.
Equilibrium
The solution concept is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. On the basis of the expected outcomes for each group in all subgames for any , group j selects the preferred level of at the beginning of the game. Appendix A contains all the tedious algebra steps, but the following description of the analysis should be su¢ cient to understand what is going on.
Clearly, the choice of can be reduced to a binary choice between = 0 and the "buying o¤" minimum level of making group i indi¤erent between accepting and challenging. The endogenously selected depends on . For high , i.e., when it is likely that group i can have a window of opportunity to challenge the status quo if exploitative, j chooses the "buying o¤" strategy for a wider range of parameter values.
While for many parameter values there exists an that can prevent con ‡ict, we will show that this is not always the case, regardless of and regardless of the timing of the game. This bargaining failure result, holding in spite of the availability of credible transfers, and hence in contrast with the "political Coase theorem" in Acemoglu (2003) , is the main punchline of this section.
To explain the intuition right away, note …rst that group j prefers peace to centrist con ‡ict
, while group i prefers peace to centrist and secessionist con ‡ict for
(see Appendix A for details). Due to the destruction of war c < always holds. In line with standard intuition in the presence of a single form of con ‡ict, transfers could always assure peace, as the destruction of war creates some peace dividend to be distributed (
Things are di¤erent, however, in the presence of multiple con ‡icts. For a range of parameter values, s > holds. In these cases no level of can be found for which con ‡ict can always be avoided. This result does not hinge on the sequential structure of Nature drawing the mover, as the bargaining failure result holds for the same parameter values even in the simultaneous move game in Appendix B. Our bargaining failure result can be summarized in the …rst proposition of the paper: 16
Proposition 1 There exist parameter values under which no surplus sharing exists that can avoid a con ‡ict.
Proof. See case 3 in Appendix A, where p s
It is easy to see that this type of bargaining failure is more likely when r 1 is su¢ ciently large, and when p s =p c is large. The intuition here is that when r 1 or p s =p c become too small, secessionist con ‡ict becomes less attractive and we would fall back into a situation with only one form of salient threat (i.e., centrist con ‡ict). Further, when accumulated usable wealth is small compared to the "cake" from natural resources, and con ‡ict is not very destructive (small d) it is harder to avoid war.
Using the explicit dependence of p s and p c on the distribution of populations of the di¤erent groups in the territory, the condition for bargaining failure becomes
This reveals that con ‡ict is more likely when the minority group i is very concentrated (large n 1 i ) and the corresponding region relatively homogeneous (low n 1 j ); and state capacity is low (i.e., low ). The results of the comparative statics implied by the characterization of Proposition 1 are summarized below.
Corollary 1 Con ‡ict becomes more salient when 1. the winning chances of the minority are much better for secessionist than for centrist con ‡ict, 2. most of the natural resources are located in the region of the minority group, 3. a country is poor and/or war is not very destructive, 4. the minority group is very concentrated in a relatively homogeneous region, 5. state capacity is low.
This characterization can be displayed graphically in terms of n 1 i , r 1 and d (cf. Figures 1-3) . 17 We conclude this section by illustrating that the bargaining failure due to multiple types of con ‡ict can occur even in a democracy. Consider the following "poor democracy" example:
would arise under any other bargaining procedure to set surplus sharing. Example 1 Consider a proportional democratic benchmark, in which surplus sharing is determined by vote strength, i.e., D = n i n i +n j and where there is perfect wealth equality, i.e., w i = w j . When the country is poor (low w) and / or con ‡ict is not very destructive (low d), and if an ethnic minority is very concentrated in an area with large resource rents (high n 1 i and high r 1 ), even such perfect democracy in an egalitarian society cannot guarantee peace.
Basically, as soon as our bargaining failure condition holds, s > , even "fair" surplus sharing in a perfect democracy cannot prevent con ‡ict. In the worst case scenario we can even end up in a situation where any of the two groups would like to start war because s > D > . 18 This can occur when the minority group is very concentrated (large n 1 i =n 1 j ), when the geographical distribution of natural resources is unequal (high r 1 ), the country is poor and con ‡ict is not very destructive (small dw), and when state capacity is neither too small nor too large (intermediate ). For these parameter values either group that has a window of opportunity would like to start con ‡ict.
In a dynamic snapshot interpretation, even though the two groups are equally well o¤ from the past and democracy has already been achieved, a new con ‡ict can erupt because of regional resources plus ethnic con ‡ict interaction when r 1 jumps su¢ ciently high. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that stresses the importance of democracy for peace, when s > D > , a shift away from proportional democracy towards a non-democratic regime N D , with N D > s or N D < , can reduce the frequency of war (making it dependent on ), but without eliminat-1 8 Expressed in structural parameters, this corresponds to
ing it. Note also that if we start from one of these non democratic surplus sharing regimes, for example with an below , the most promising policies to establish peace would be related to fostering development rather than pushing democracy. In the next section we instead show that in the presence of bargaining frictions and when countries are less poor there are indeed cases where democratic power sharing can reduce con ‡ict.
Fixed Surplus Sharing
In many cases it is not feasible to signi…cantly change in the short run in reaction to stochastic shocks such as resource discoveries. A substantial part of surplus sharing goes through patronage spending for ethnic employment, which typically takes much time to change. In Northern Ireland, for example, it took decades to democratize the police force and to make sure that the fully protestant force could become religiously mixed. Also reforms of …scal systems and inter-regional transfers need years to be implemented. Think of the debate on sharing Scotland's oil wealth.
Scotland now has a local parliament and receives the highest per capita public spending in the UK from Westminster, but it had to wait for decades. When such rigidities make it impossible to adapt to changing conditions, our model yields some additional predictions with respect to those already obtained in the previous section.
When < s , of course it does not matter whether is easy or hard to change. Now we want to focus on situations in which the additional rigidities in changing can lead to con ‡ict even if > s .
Group i prefers peace to accepted secession when a r 1 r 1 +r 2 . To eliminate uninteresting cases, we assume > a . Note also that i A > i S and accordingly a > s always holds (this helps us to simplify some of the following expressions).
The proposition below fully characterizes the di¤erent outcomes for all …xed levels of .
Proposition 2
When > , centrist con ‡ict triggered by group j occurs with probability
(1 ), and peace prevails otherwise.
When , peace occurs if group i does not have the opportunity to take action against the status quo (probability (1 )), whereas with probability i has a chance to choose it's preferred action, and the following possibilities arise:
-Peace occurs under the two following su¢ cient conditions: (I) max f c ; a g; (II) max f c ; s g and dw j n 1 j < (1 p s )r 1 . (I) and (II) together are a necessary condition.
-Centrist con ‡ict occurs under the following su¢ cient conditions: (III) < c and r 2 >
(1 pc)r 1 +dw i n i pc ; (IV) < c and r 2 > (ps pc)r 1 +dw i (n i n 1 i ) pc and dw j n 1 j < (1 p s )r 1 . (III) and (IV) together are a necessary condition.
-Secessionist con ‡ict occurs under the following necessary and su¢ cient condition: (V)
and dw j n 1 j < (1 p s )r 1 .
-Accepted secession occurs under the following necessary and su¢ cient condition: (VI)
Proof. Follows from the comparison of the payo¤ functions for the various outcomes.
The four relevant zones of parameters for the di¤erent outcomes are displayed in Figure 4 below.
The same parameter values are used as in the …gures before, the only di¤erence being that now we focus on a case where con ‡ict is more destructive (d = 0:3), which creates a larger "peace dividend"
and always would prevent bargaining failure if could be freely and easily changed.
The zone "Peace" corresponds to parameter values where the peaceful status quo always persists, independently of the identity of the …rst mover. In the zone "Centrist Con ‡ict" on top of the …gure (i.e., above ), centrist con ‡ict occurs when group j moves …rst, and peace holds when group i is the …rst mover. In contrast, in the four zones at the bottom of this …gure, the indicated outcomes occur when group i is the …rst mover, while for group j moving …rst peace is sustained. In particular, for exploitatively low levels of , centrist con ‡ict dominates for low and intermediate levels of r 1 , peacefully accepted secession occurs for intermediate levels of r 1 , and secessionist con ‡ict takes place for a high r 1 . 19 It is hard to think of historical cases in which is so high that the dominant group would like to start centrist con ‡ict, as the ruling elite usually …nds ways to guarantee that the status quo is in their favor. Hence, in the discussion below we will only focus on situations where < , in which therefore the incentives for the minority group i are most salient.
The power share can be compared to two benchmarks: the relative military strength of group i, i.e., R p c = n i w i n i w i +n j w j + , and the relative resources, i.e., R r 1 r 1 +r 2 . Thus, power sharing has two potential benchmarks: "minimum strength proportionality" 20 and "resource proportionality".
All the above analysis has an important conceptual corollary that relates to the role of proportional power sharing for peace: 1 9 A similar characterization could be achieved with simultaneous moves (see Appendix B). In that case a key variable determining the various cases is whether a group is able to escalate a secessionist con ‡ict into a centrist all-out con ‡ict or vice versa, rather than depending on a random draw of Nature like in the sequential move version.
2 0 This concept is labeled "minimum strength proportionality" because we relate to pc, where pc < ps. Corollary 2 When the minority group i starts a centrist con ‡ict that aims to take over the control of the State, a failure of "minimum strength proportionality" of the initial power sharing arrangement is always involved.
On the other hand, when we observe a secessionist con ‡ict, the initial power sharing must have failed to satisfy "resource proportionality".
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.
Intuitively, when a group is militarily strong, mostly the "minimum strength proportionality" condition is salient, while for a minority group with resource-rich homelands the "resource proportionality" criterion becomes binding. This becomes also apparent in Figure 4 : When r 1 increases group i requires a larger to maintain peace (note that the upper bound of the "Secessionist
Con ‡ict" zone is increasing in r 1 ). Similarly, in this same …gure an increase in p c would extend upwards the height of the two "Centrist Con ‡ict" rectangles at the bottom of the …gure, thereby increasing the minimum level of for which peace can be maintained.
To sum up, assume that the parameter values are such that we are not in the "bargaining failure" range, and peace can always be sustained at least for some values of . In this context power sharing can help preventing con ‡ict, by respecting the "minimum strength proportionality" and/or "resource proportionality" criteria.
Empirically, having an equitable democracy with an intermediate value of that is acceptable for both groups will reduce the risk of war onsets, in countries with a large enough "peace dividend" that makes con ‡ict preventable. This is typically the case in intermediately or fully developed countries (see Collier and Rohner, 2008) .
Empirical Relevance of the Main Predictions
Our main goal has been to provide a framework to analyze the e¤ect of the distribution of natural resources across regions and groups on the di¤erent types of civil con ‡ict. We now want to judge the usefulness of this framework on the basis of the predictions it o¤ers. Since the propositions provide a characterization of equilibrium in di¤erent relevant cases, we now want to ‡esh out the most interesting testable predictions that can be derived from such propositions and check how they relate to the existing empirical literature.
1. The …rst nuance that our model provides about the role of natural resources is that they pose the greater challenge the more unevenly distributed they are on a territory. This result is both present for the endogenous and for the …xed rent sharing cases. A greater r 1 basically implies that ethnic divisions can be reinforced by the geographical distribution of natural resources.
In other words, when most natural resources are concentrated in the area of a local ethnic group that is not politically dominant, secessionist civil tensions are very likely. The …xed rent sharing case also provides further predictions on what forms of con ‡ict we should expect:
For r 1 > r 2 we should observe more secessionist con ‡icts, while for r 1 < r 2 centrist con ‡icts should be more frequent. Empirically, the secessionist con ‡icts of Timor-Leste, Sudan or Nigeria …t the case of r 1 > r 2 , while for example Angola is a compelling case of r 1 < r 2 and centrist con ‡ict. 21
2. Typically countries with huge export shares of (and per capita income from) natural resources like for example Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar etc are small countries that due to their tiny size almost by de…nition have an even distribution of natural resources. Interestingly, these countries often achieve remarkable political stability. Countries with intermediate export shares of natural resources, like Angola or Nigeria, are usually geographically larger and tend 2 1 Indeed, the two main factions in Angola's centrist con ‡icts of the last four decades are the dominant MPLA (group j) and the minority faction UNITA (group i). Angola is very rich in oil and diamonds, where especially the latter play a big role, as they are among the best diamonds in the world. The diamonds are mostly concentrated in the North-East of the country (in the Lunda provinces) and there most of the …ghting takes place. The underlying ethnic group of the UNITA rebels are the Ovimbundu who have their geographical homeland in the central Bié Plateau region that is rather poor in natural resources. Thus, r1=(r1 + r2) is low. Also, the MPLA has been reluctant to share power (low ), while the UNITA rebels have always focused mainly on trying to control the diamond mines. In a nutshell, our model would predict centrist con ‡ict without secessionist goals between UNITA and MPLA, which is exactly what we have observed.
to have uneven distributions of natural resources. They are also frequently exposed to con‡ict. Hence, Collier and Hoe-er's (2004) …nding that countries with intermediate natural resource exports over GDP are more likely to experience civil war could indeed be indirectly related to the unevenness e¤ects described above. 22 3. The model also predicts that con ‡icts are particularly frequent in situations when the probability of the minority group of winning a secessionist con ‡ict is substantially larger than of winning a centrist war. This is the case when the minority group is geographically very concentrated in their homelands and when state capacity is weak. Consistent with this, Gates (2002) and Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) …nd that in situations where the rebelling minority group is concentrated in remote peripheral areas and …ghts a localized war in this region, its odds of winning are larger and con ‡ict tends to be harder to eradicate. Further, 4. Another interesting point is that wealth in general has very di¤erent implications from natural resource abundance. A general increase in natural resources (i.e., larger r 1 and r 2 ) clearly makes the peaceful status quo more di¢ cult to sustain, as shown in Proposition 1. This is consistent with the empirical …ndings in the literature that the rents from natural resources monotonically increase the risk of civil war (e.g., Ross, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Lujala, 2010) .
5. The situation is somewhat di¤erent for non-resource wealth w. In Jackson and Morelli (2007) the e¤ect of relative wealth on the probability of con ‡ict was ambiguous, because wealth was the target of con ‡ict as well as its input. Here, the realistic assumption that natural resources neither a¤ect the probability of winning nor are particularly a¤ected by wars eliminates that ambiguity. We …nd that higher wealth w decreases the risk of war, consistent with the empirical results by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoe-er (2004) . Moreover, relative wealth changes would a¤ect the probability of con ‡ict of one kind or another only through the consequences on the contest success function.
6. In our model both ethnic divisions and natural resource abundance (large r 1 and r 2 ) are necessary conditions for con ‡ict. This is consistent with the empirical result of Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) , pointing out that diamonds only increase the risk of con ‡ict in the presence of ethnic fractionalization. Similarly, our framework is also in line with the …nding that violent secession attempts are most likely when ethnic groups are geographically concentrated (Walter, 2006) . 7. Further, ethnic cleavages are more likely to result in con ‡ict onsets when there are no power sharing institutions in place (see Reynal-Querol, 2002; Saideman et al., 2002; Cederman and Girardin, 2007) . More speci…cally, there is also evidence that political under-representation leads to a higher risk of violent self-determination challenges (Walter, 2006) . These empirical …ndings are perfectly rationalized in our model. In the absence of proportionality of power sharing with respect to both strength and natural resources, con ‡ict can be very hard to avoid, and we have shown which of the two criteria is responsible for the di¤erent types of con ‡ict (see Corollary 2). Our results could be used to provide theoretical micro-foundations for Collier and Rohner (2008) 's empirical …nding that democracy and power sharing mostly decreases the risk of war in rich nations, but can actually lead to more political violence in poor states (in which the "peace dividend" is smaller and s > is more likely to hold).
8. Interestingly, a small level of could in some instances be interpreted as "grievances" (or "motives"). While approaches explaining the occurrence of con ‡ict with frustration from relative deprivation have traditionally been in ‡uential in political science (e.g., Gurr, 1970) , they have in recent years been challenged by rational choice frameworks mostly developed by economists and focusing on "greed" or "feasibility" (see Collier and Hoe-er, 2004; Collier, Hoe-er and Rohner, 2009 , for a distinction of these approaches). Our model is able to reconcile both intellectual traditions by taking motives into account in a game theoretic framework of utility maximizing players.
9. In particular, con ‡ict outbreaks due to a failure to achieve resource proportionality could be linked to "grievances", as they are related to some underlying conception of an "unfair" natural resource distribution. In contrast, a violation of minimum strength proportionality could be interpreted as "greed"-related factor. Interestingly, Collier and Hoe-er (2004) have interpreted their empirical …nding that natural resources fuel civil con ‡ict as evidence in favor of "greed"-based explanations, disregarding the role of grievances. Our reading of the resource proportionality criterion revives grievances as contributing factor to wars. The model goes even one step beyond that: It features the implication that grievances play a greater role in secessionist con ‡icts (where resource proportionality is crucial) than in centrist wars (where the minimum strength proportionality matters heavily). This is in line with the empirical evidence, as pointed out by Ross (2004b: 63) : "Resources appear to play a di¤erent role in separatist con ‡icts than in nonseparatist con ‡icts. Grievances over the distribution of resource wealth helped initiate (...) separatist wars (...), but grievances of all types played no role in (...) nonseparatist wars." 10. Further, our model also generates predictions about which kinds of natural resources are particularly risky. As shown in Proposition 1, it becomes harder to maintain peace when the natural resources of a country are very valuable, i.e., when r 1 and r 2 are large. This prediction is in line with the empirical evidence suggesting that diamonds (Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Lujala, 2010) , oil (De Soysa, 2002; Ross, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005) and coca (Angrist and Kugler, 2008) are particularly conducive to civil con ‡ict. Further, as mentioned above the model predicts that geographical concentration of natural resources is risky. This can rationalize the peace threatening e¤ect of diamonds and oil, which are essentially point resources that tend to be unevenly distributed in the terrain.
It is therefore not surprising that the oil-rich regions of e.g., Iraq, Nigeria or Indonesia and diamond-rich countries like for example Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of Congo have traditionally been hotspots of con ‡ict.
11. Finally, our model can also be interpreted in a broader sense and be applied to regional interstate wars. The recent con ‡ict in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia can for example be analyzed in terms of our framework. The unit of analysis is in this case the Caucasus.
The dominant power, Russia, corresponds to group j, while Georgia is the minority group i. Natural resources are broadly interpreted, including rents from "strategic" geopolitical location. Rents are signi…cant here, given that two major oil pipelines, the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Baku-Supsa pipeline, cross Georgian territory. 23 In terms of the model these large geopolitical rents correspond to a high r 1 . As most "political in ‡uence" rents are appropriated by Russia, is low. Thus, our model predicts "secessionist con ‡ict", where sovereign Georgia attempts to break free of Russia's zone of in ‡uence, while Russia …ghts back to maintain its grip. In line with the predictions, in recent years Russia has fueled separatist rebellion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which weakened Georgia and provided Russia with a pretext for intervention. The recent military confrontation in August 2008 has been the logical consequence of this process, and has consolidated Russia's control of Caspian oil.
E¤ects of Uneven Natural Resource Abundance on the Ethnic Group Level
The existing empirical literature on natural resources and civil war has two main weaknesses: First, it only studies the e¤ects of the total amount of natural resources and not of their geographical distribution. Second, it studies the impact of natural resource abundance mostly on the country level rather than on the ethnic group level. On such an aggregate level of analysis there is much unobserved heterogeneity in the data.
To address these concerns, we will now analyze the e¤ects of natural resource abundance on con ‡ict with panel data on the ethnic group level. In particular we construct group level variables that capture closely the expression r 1 =(r 1 + r 2 ) of the model. There is a small number of papers in the literature that study con ‡ict on the ethnic group level (e.g., Walter, 2006) , but these papers either ignore natural resources or use a natural resource variable at the country-level, which does not allow to capture unevenness of resource distribution. Hence, to the best of our knowledge we are the …rst to study civil war using a panel on the ethnic group level with natural resource variables that vary for di¤erent ethnic groups.
To construct the dataset, we use as starting point the data of the "Minorities at Risk" (MAR) project which follows a multitude of ethnic minority groups over several years. All data is explained in detail in Appendix D. Below we focus on describing the construction of our novel independent variable, the surface of an ethnic group's territory covered with oil and gas as a percentage of the country's total surface covered with oil and gas. This proxies very well r 1 =(r 1 + r 2 ).
First, we matched the ethnic groups in the MAR dataset with the ethnic groups in the "Georeferencing of ethnic groups" (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rod and Cederman, 2010) , which allowed us to know the geographical coordinates of where a given ethnic group settles. Then we merged this with the geo-referenced petroleum dataset (PETRODATA) from Lujala, Rod and Thieme (2007) , which tells us where oil …elds lie. Combining this information we were able to compute a variable measuring which part of the territory occupied by a given ethnic group contains oil. Expressing this in terms of the total surface containing oil in the country, we obtain a rather precise measure of how relatively petrol-rich the homelands of a given ethnic group are.
As shown in the existing literature (e.g., Collier and Hoe-er, 1998; Gartzke, 1999; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009) , we can think of war as a stochastic process, as some of the parameters of the model may in each period be drawn from an underlying distribution. This allows us to estimate the risk of war onset using logit regressions, which is standard in the con ‡ict literature.
In Table 1 we display the e¤ects of the group's relative resource abundance, which is a proxy for r 1 =(r 1 + r 2 ), and group concentration, which is a proxy for p s =p c , on inter-group con ‡ict and separatism. Our theory predicts that if the ethnic minority group is very resource rich relative to the rest of the country and at the same time geographically very concentrated (which makes secession "easier" than centrist con ‡ict), this given ethnic group is more likely to be involved in inter-group con ‡ict or in secessionist rebellion. Hence, we expect a group's relative resource abundance to induce a larger risk of con ‡ict, and this in particular when the group is geographically concentrated.
In other words, we expect the resource abundance (A) and its interaction term with concentration (C) to be jointly positive and signi…cant. This is indeed the case. Similarly, our theory predicts that increases in group concentration (B) lead to a higher con ‡ict risk, and the more so when the group's homelands are relatively resource rich. This is indeed the case, given that (B) and (C) are jointly positive and signi…cant. All the results are robust to the inclusion of various control variables (described in Appendix D). Table 2 includes …rst country …xed e¤ects and then group …xed e¤ects, with the goal of addressing unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. 24 As before, more resource abundance when groups are concentrated, and more group concentration when their regions are resource abundant, will both continue to fuel the risk of con ‡ict, even when country …xed e¤ects are included.
The group concentration variable is not time-varying on the group level. Therefore, when we include group …xed e¤ects (from column (3) onwards) this variable drops. But group …xed e¤ects allow us to check if resource unevenness continues to matter under very demanding conditions. We …nd that relative resource abundance of a given ethnic group remains a statistically signi…cant predictor of inter-group con ‡ict. In column (4) we show that it is really the relative and not absolute resource abundance of the ethnic group that matters and in column (5) we show that the results are also robust if only oil (without gas) is included in the regressions.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simple model to capture how the geographical distribution of natural resources within a country can a¤ect the risk of civil con ‡ict of di¤erent types. We have allowed for uneven resource abundance and two di¤erent forms of con ‡ict, secessionist and centrist, and found that bargaining fails to prevent costly con ‡ict if an ethnic minority group is situated in a region that is particularly rich in natural resources (relative to the rest of the country) and if its winning probability for the case of secessionist con ‡ict is substantially larger than for centrist con ‡ict. This leads to the presence of two relevant threat points for war, which cannot be addressed at the same time by bargaining.
The new simple theory of bargaining breakdown due to multiple types of con ‡ict is not only interesting per se, in our opinion, but it is also shown to …t very nicely with most existing empirical …ndings and with the estimations on our newly constructed data set with detailed geographic information about ethnic groups and resources.
Future research could explore the implications of the dynamic extension of our game theoretic framework, making the wealth and capacity stocks depend also on the accumulation of saved resource rents and past wars. In such a dynamic setting we would expect that over time the world moves from fewer and heterogeneous states to more and homogeneous states, in contrast with the indications that one could draw by introducing economies of scale and the like (see e.g., Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). Even though the dynamic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the simplicity and tractability of our model should suggest that indeed this path of future research is feasible and desirable, lending additional positive externality value to the present paper.
E(
j ( = c )) = (1 c )(r 1 + r 2 )
Group j would select = c i¤ the following condition holds (and = 0 otherwise): p c (1 )(r 1 + r 2 ) + dw i n i + dw j n j > 0
This condition holds when is large enough. It is in this case always possible to guarantee a peaceful outcome with > 0, as there is only one relevant form of con ‡ict (C), under which the sum of payo¤s is below the sum of payo¤s for peace. This condition holds when is large enough. In this third case for both = 0 or = s there will be con ‡ict for some draws and it is not possible to guarantee peace even in the presence of credible transfers.
is possible or e¤ective).
Case 1: p c > p s r 1 r 1 +r 2
In this case for = 0 the outcome is C, while for = c the outcome is P . As > c we know that group j will select = c in equilibrium and the outcome will be P . For = 0 we will observe S; whereas for = s the outcome is P . Hence, as > s we obtain in equilibrium = s and P .
Case 3: p s r 1 r 1 +r 2 > p c + d(w i n 1 i +w j n j ) r 1 +r 2 =) s > > c > 0 For = 0 group i plays s resulting in S; whereas for = s group i plays s (preemptive, to avoid C), which leads again to S. Hence, we obtain in equilibrium = f0; s g and S.
Once again the bargaining failure condition is the same as in Proposition 1, but which con ‡ict will be observed depends on whether escalation is possible or not.
